



So much of the business of the world is done through the
agency of corporations, and so many people are stockholders in
these institutions, that few legal questions are of interest to a
greater number of persons than those relating to the ownership
of stock and corporate control by stockholders.
While it is true that the directors control and manage the cor-
poration's business, free from dictation by the shareholders, the
power to determine who shall be directors rests with the share-
holders and they may by their votes annually change the direc-
torate if they so desire. So that the policy of the corporation
may and should be determined by the shareholders electing to
the directorship those who stand for the views of a majority of
the owners, or stockholders. For, however distinct may be the
corporation from the stockholders who compose it, they are the
parties most directly interested in its affairs. They have fur-
nished the funds for its working capital, are entitled to whatever
dividends are declared from its profits, or sustain to the extent
of this capital, whatever loss may come from its reverses, and
upon its dissolution they succeed to all its property.
Since the principle of majority control applies to corporate
affairs and majorities are determined not by the number of indi-
viduals or shareholders, but by the number of shares of stock
voted, one person may be able to outvote all other members of
the corporation, and thus enforce his plan of management or
mismanagement, over the combined objections of all others.
The subject of voting trusts within a single corporation has
not received from the courts as much attention as have those
agreements for the combination of different corporations and
partnerships engaged in the same business. The two agreements
have little similarity, are for purposes entirely different, and are
not governed by the same rules of law. The one is a combination
of stockholders only for the purpose of managing the affairs of
a single corporation; the other has for its purpose the combining
of competing institutions with the power if not the purpose of
increasing the price of the commodity produced. For this reason
alone the latter is held to be against public policy and void as a
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contract. But in the voting trust there is no combination which
in itself is against public policy nor which violates any law.
This power of control by a bare majority of stock is of greater
importance than at first may appear, for it can be used to the
corporation's detriment as well as for its good. So long as those
who are in control keep within the law of corporations, there is
no way by which the minority can interfere to prevent what may
seem to be extravagant and destructive methods.
The profits may be absorbed in large salaries of officers and
directors, all of whom may be selected from the majority share-
holders, thus making the stock of the majority valuable, while
that of the minority could not be sold upon the market, simply
because it is minority stock. Or if the profits are not thus
absorbed the directors, at the dictate of the majority, all of whom
may be holding offices with munificent salaries, may reasonably
invest such extra profits in enlarging the business, instead of de-
claring dividends. Numerous methods may be adopted by the
majority, keeping entirely within their legal rights, by which the
capital of the minority shareholders is made profitable only to
those in control. And if, emboldened by success, they overstep
the boundary of legal rights and withhold from the minority
what is justly theirs, or take from the corporation that to which
they are not legally entitled, a stockholder may well hesitate to
begin proceedings to correct the evil. Theoretically, the loss is
not his, but is that of the corporation. The right of action be-
longs to it and not to him. Since it is under the control of the
wrong-doers, they, of course, will not permit suit to be conducted
in its name. By showing these facts the shareholder may sue in
his own name, but if he wins after annoying tedious litigation,
the amount recovered inures only indirectly to his benefit, for
it belongs not to him but to the corporation, and must be covered
back into its treasury, to be again managed by those in control.
It should not be assumed, however, that this power of ma-
jority control will be used to the detriment of either the cor-
poration or the other shareholders. It is, in fact, rarely so exer-
cised; but on the other hand it will be found that corporate busi-
ness, like that of the individual, is usually conducted on a basis
of honesty and fair dealing. As a rule, those who place them-
selves in control of corporate affairs do so for the purpose of
giving all who are interested equal benefits, faithfully executing
the trust imposed upon them. The power they hold is all the
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more important because it can be used in excluding from the
directorship those who would wreck such institutions for private
gain.
Because of the importance of majority control, many schemes
have been devised by ingenious lawyers to organize a voting ma-
jority of shareholders for the purpose of temporarily or per-
manently managing corporate affairs. These contracts have
usually proven unsatisfactory to one or more of the parties in-
terested in them, and have therefore in various ways come into
the courts, to be tried and their legality tested. Many of them
have been condemned as illegal, because against public policy.
Others have been held not to be against public policy, but have
been adjudged voidable at the election of any party to them. Still
others have been held valid and binding upon all parties affected
by them, and courts have enforced them according to their terms.
But it is believed that no contract of this character has yet been
passed upon by the courts where the vital purpose of such an
agreement was tested by litigation. For the prime object which
stockholders, entering into any such arrangement, have in view
is to form a combination which cannot be overthrown by any of
the parties to it-one which will remain intact for the period
agreed upon, although some of the parties thereto may be
tempted beyond that which they are able to bear, by a combined
minority offering them many times the real value of their stock
for the purpose of securing to themselves the balance of power.
In short, the most important question touching this whole matter
is: Can a voting trust be so formed by a majority of share-
holders that its continued existence may be relied upon by those
who enter into it? Or, do the dangers of illegality, voidability
and liability to breach by some of its members, attach to all such
combinations?
It will be important to examine the different kinds of voting
agreements which have been passed upon by the courts. They
may be divided into at least three classes above indicated, namely,
void, voidable and valid.
VoiD AGREEMENTS.
Where the purpose of such agreements is illegal, the courts
promptly pronounce them invalid. To determine their validity,
the object which governed the shareholders in forming the con-
tract will be looked into by the courts.
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So where the agreement contained a provision whereby one of
the parties thereto should be continuously employed at a specified
salary as general manager of the corporation, it was held invalid2
So where such contract is made with another corporation to
hold and vote the stock, which power is ultra vires the holding
corporation ;2 so in any case where the agreement amounts simply
to a contract by the shareholder to sell or barter away his right to
vote.3 The courts say that a sale by a shareholder in such case is
against public policy and illegal, upon the same theory that a
sale by a citizen of his vote at a municipal election, or a sale by
a director of a corporation of his vote in a directors' meeting is
illegal. Other cases bold clearly that any contract is void in
which the voting power of the shareholder is separated from the
title to the stock and it will not be enforced by the courts.
4
The Shepaug Voting Trust Cases' bear directly on this phase
of the subject. Here a syndicate secured a majority of the stock
of the Shepaug Railroad Company, placing the same in a voting
trust for a period of five years. A certain trust company was
made trustee of this stock for the purpose of voting it as directed
by a committee appointed by the syndicate. It was shown that
the syndicate by this arrangement not only secured the control of
the railway company, but that there was a secret purpose to make
for themselves a profit out of certain construction contracts which
they were able to secure. The court held the whole contract
void for this reason.
In Kreissl v. Distilling Co. of America, 61 N. J. Eq., 5, the fol-
lowing rule touching the illegality of such combinations is
adopted: "If stockholders combine * * * to entrust and con-
fide to others the formulation and execution of a plan for the
management of the affairs of the corporation, and exclude them-
selves by acts made and attempted to be made irrevocable for a
fixed period, from the exercise of judgment thereon, or if they
I Cohen v. Russell, 48 N. J. Eq., 208; Gage v. Fisher, 5 N. D., 297.
2 Hafer iv. Ry. Co., Jewett et al., 14 Weekly Law Bul. (Ohio), 68.
3 Guernsey v. Cook, i2o Mass., 501; Noel v. Drake, 28 Kans., 265;
Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass., 3o9; Freon v. Carriage Co., 43 Ohio
St., 38; West v. Camden, 135 U. S., 513.
4 White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Co., 52 N. J. Eq., 178; Shepaug
Voting Trust Cases, 6o Conn., 576; Cone v. Russell, 3 Dick. Chancery
Rep., 208.
5 6o Conn., 553; Harvey v. Improvement Co., 118 N. C., 6g3; Moses v.
Scott, 84 Ala., 6o8.
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reserve to themselves any benefit to be derived from such plan
to the exclusion of other stockholders who do not come into the
combination, then such combination and the acts done to effectu-
ate it are contrary to public policy, and other stockholders have
a right to the interposition of a court of equity to prevent its
being put into operation."
While the courts do not all agree that an irrevocable proxy
given by a shareholder to another to vbte his stock for a fixed
period is invalid as against public policy many do so hold, upon
the theory that each stockholder owes to all others the duty of
exercising the right to vote in all matters relating to the welfare
of the corporation, which means, necessarily, the welfare of all
the stockholders. This privilege and duty creates a fiduciary
relationship between shareholders which cannot be irrevocably
transferred to some one else.
When a voting contract contains some provision which is
against public policy, it vitiates and makes void the entire agree-
ment, and the court will for this reason set aside the whole con-
tract.8 Many other examples might be cited where courts have
held these contracts illegal, but the foregoing will illustrate this
class.
VOIDABLE AGREEMENTS.
Those agreements may be regarded as voidable in which. pkr-
ties thereto may continue their execution, against the will of
other persons who are interested but not parties to the agree-
ments, or may at any time withdraw therefrom. They are not
against public policy but are not enforceable contracts. In this
class, the more recent cases seem to place so-called irrevocable
proxies and combinations which for a definite period, separate the
voting power from the ownership of the stock, though as above
indicated the courts are in conflict here.
Where shareholders in a corporation place their stock in the
hands of trustees with power to vote it, and a clause in the con-
tract declares this power to be irrevocable, even those courts
which do not regard the contract as violating pubilc policy, hold
it voidable at the will of the parties to it. The rule generally
6 Gage v. Fisher, supra; Wieber v. Stoepel, 82 Mich., 344; Noys v.
Marsh, 123 Mass., 286.
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followed in such cases is well stated in Griffith v. Jewett,7 as fol-
lows: "The owners of these trust certificates are equitable
owners of the shares of stock which they represent, and being
such the individual right to vote upon the stock pertains to them.
They may permit the trustees as holders of the legal title to vote
in their stead if they choose, but when they elect to exercise the
power themselves, the law will not permit the trustees to refuse
it to them."
This rule meets the approval of one's judgment. It permits
one to appoint another to vote for him so long as there is no
fraud or injury to anyone else intended; but as in the case of an
appointment of an agent to perform other acts, the agency is at
any time revocable by the principal.
Since stockholders have the power to combine in an election,
with a view of placing in office certain persons, for the benefit
of the corporation, there is no good reason why this combination
for lawful objects, and the preservation of the company's best
interests should not be continued indefinitely. And for the better
accomplishment of this purpose shareholders should be permitted
to place their stock in hands of trustees so long as all agree to
do so.'
VALID AGREEMENTS.
A number of cases have arisen where for the best interests of
the corporation involved, agreements have been entered into by
various shareholders to place their stock in trustees' hands to be
voted as directed by interested persons, such as creditors, who
in consideration of this arrangement refrain from pressing their
claims.
In other cases capital was furnished to aid corporations in
financial straits, on condition that the control of corporate affairs
should be thus given over to a committee for a definite period.9
While in these cases the voting power is separated from the
title to the stock, they are distinguished from those where the
7 Weekly Law Bulletin (Ohio), 419.
SRailway Co. et al. v. State ex rel., 49 Ohio St., 668; Vanderbilt v.
Bennett, 6 Pa. Cbunty Court Rep., 193; Chapman v. Bates, 6i N. J. Eq.,
658; Fisher v. Bush, 35 Hun., (N. Y.) 641; Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala., 6o8;
Woodruff v. Dubuque Co., 30 Fed. Rep., 91; People ex rel. Union Ins. Co.
v. Nash et al., iii N. Y., 310.
9Mobile R. R. Co. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala., 92; Havemeyer v. Havemeyer,
Ii Jones & S., 506.
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sale of the voting power was involved, in that the purpose was to
aid the corporation without intending an injury to anyone. The
power to vote is coupled with an interest.
In Mobile R. R. Co. v. Nicholas, supra, an agreement of this
character was involved. The company had defaulted in some of
its interest payments and was financially embarrassed. An agree-
ment between its creditors, some of whom had already begun
foreclosure proceedings, resulted in a discontinuance of the liti-
gation, upon condition that certain financial aid should be secured
by a number of the stockholders placing their stock in the hands
of a trust company with an irrevocable power of attorney to
vote the stock so long as the debentures of the company re-
mained unpaid.
This arrangement having been completed the trust company
took possession of and voted the stock for a number of years.
Later some of the owners of the stock claimed the right, person-
ally, to vote thereon, and attempted by injunction to prevent the
trust company from doing so, on the theory that their contract
was illegal as against public policy. The court refused to sus-
tain this contention and said that "in determining the validity of
an agreement which provides for the vesting of the voting power
in a person other than the stockholder, regard should be had to
the condition of the parties, the purposes to be accomplished, the
consideration of the undertaking, interests which have been sur-
rendered, rights acquired and the consequences to result."
A number of recent cases have gone still farther, and hold that
when there is a pooling contract, based upon sufficient considera-
tion, in which the voting power is separated from the ownership
of the stock irrevocably, for a fixed period of time, for proper
purposes, such contract is valid and will be enforced. 10 The ten-
dency of the courts is now to uphold such contracts when they
are based upon a sufficient consideration, whether the prime
object is to aid the corporation or not.
By an act of April 16, 19o6, the Legislature of New York
made provision for stockholders to vest their voting power for a
period not exceeding five years in other persons, without trans-
ferring the title of the stock, and in the same law prohibited the
selling of votes or proxies by shareholders.
1o Smith et al. v. San Francisco Ry. Co. et al., 115 Cal., 584; Bright-
man v. Bates, 175 Mass., io5; Mobile Ry. Co. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala., 92;
Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill., 416.
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But there is nothing to prevent a shareholder who has made
such contract, however valid, from violating it, and subjecting
himself to damages for its breach. One owning ten shares may
thus hold the power to give to one, or to another group of share-
holders the majority, by selling to them his stock, thereby giving
them control of the corporation. Damages which could be re-
covered for such breach would probably be nominal only, or if
substantial, could not compensate for the loss of control of the
corporate affairs, and the resultant depreciation of values in the
stock of those who thereby lost the majority.
-To obviate this condition, it is said in Harvey v. Linville Im-
provement Co., i18 N. C., 693, 54 Amer. St. Rep., 749, that
"various devices have been resorted to for the purpose of so tying
up the stock that no one of the parties to the 'pool' or com-
bination can break the agreement." The court then points out
the numerous plans which have been tried and defeated.
Among those mentioned are -irrevocable proxies, which were
pronounced revocable ;" the transfer of stock to trustees, and re-
ceiving instead, trust certificates. But the court said that any
holder of a trust certificate could surrender it, and demand the
return of his stock.
12
In another scheme the parties contracted together not to dis-
pose of their stock for a definite time, or only to specified per-
sons, or to purchasers acceptable to all;. but it was determined
that any party might sell his stock when and to whom he
pleased.13 Again it was attempted to restrict the sale of the
stock by by-laws, but this was held illegal. 4 And a rule would
be unlawful which provided that the purchaser of a share of
stock should be entitled to dividends but not permitted to vote
where the sale of stock was in violation of the agreement.
Wherever one corporation is permitted to own stock in an-
other corporation without restriction, an effective plan for pool-
ing stock can be easily devised. The title of a majority of stock
can be taken by the holding company to be voted by the directors
11 Woodruff v. Dubuque, 30 Fed. Rep., 91.
12 Hafer v. New York etc., R. R. Co., 14 Weekly Law Bulletin (Ohio),
68; Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 2 Ry. &'Corp. L. J., 409.
Is Moses v. Scott, 4 Southern Rep. (Ala.), 742; Fisher v. Bush, 35
Hun. (N. Y.), 642; Williams v. Montgomery, 68 Hun. (N. Y.), 416.
14 Morgan v. Struthers, 131 U. S., 246; Fechheimcr v. Nat'l Exc. Bank,
79 Va., 8o; Orr v. Bigelow, 14 N. Y., 556; In re Klaus, 29 N. W. Rep.
(Ala.), 582.
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of that company. So long as those who favor holding the stock
and voting it are directors the control will be easily maintained.
But the stockholders of the holding company may change, and
elect directors who are not in accord with the idea of thus con-
trolling one corporation by another. Besides, there are only a
few States in which one corporation can legally purchase and
hold the stock of another. Generally such purchase would be
ultra vires and could be prevented by the State or the share-
holders of the purchasing corporation. This method is also quite
cumbersome and has not proven popular.
The most feasible plan for creating the desired voting trust is
by means of a common law joint stock company. This kind of
an organization requires no legislative sanction for either its
existence or powers. It is formed by contract of the parties in-
terested, and the measure of their rights and liabilities will be
found in the articles of association. It is of the nature both of a
partnership and a corporation, but is different from either. Stock
may be issued, held and transferred as in corporations. The sale
of a share by one of the company will not, if so provided, work
a dissolution of the association, as would the sale of a partner's
interest in a partnership. The articles may provide, however,
that the purchaser of such share of stock shall not become, by
such purchase, a member of the association, unless acceptable to
all the other members. Or he may be given a right in the prop-
erty, income, or dividends without the right to vote, or to in any
way participate in the management of the company's affairs.
This restriction could not legally be imposed upon a stockholder
in a corporation. Hence, the joint stock company may be utilized
to greater advantage than could a corporation. It is not beyond
the powers of a joint stock company to purchase, hold and vote
the stock of corporations. Such an association, like a partner-
ship, may do any legal business which may be done by indi-
viduals, and may be formed for any legitimate purpose. There
could, apparently, be no objection, therefore, to the holders of a
majority of the stock in any corporation, forming a common law
joint stock company for the purpose of holding and voting the
corporate stock. It could be sold and transferred to the joint
stock company in consideration of certificates of shares in the
joint stock company, issued in lieu of the corporate stock, to the
former holders thereof. There would be no separation of the
ownership and voting power of the corporate stock, since the
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joint stock company would be both owner and voter of such
stock. It would always be voted by the directors of the joint
stock company in such way as to control the affairs of the cor-
poration. The clause limiting the purchaser's rights upon a sale
of shares in the joint stock company would prevent new share-
holders, or outsiders, securing control of the joint stock company,
or transferring any power to the minority shareholders in the
corporation. This would seem to present a plan by which the ma-
jority shareholders in a corporation can safely combine for its
control.
While, so far as the writer knows, it has never been tested by
the courts, the principles involved have, in a case or two, been
approved, where a voting trust was not concerned.
A question somewhat similar to this was involved in Harper v.
Raymond, 3 Bosworth Rep., 29 (N. Y.). There a common law
joint stock company had been formed for the purpose of publish-
ing the New York Times. The articles of association consist of
seven items, the sixth of which relates to the point under con-
sideration and reads as follows:
"Each of the parties hereto shall have the right to sell any
portion of his shares of stock; but before selling the same to any
other person, he shall offer the same to the association, giving
them the refusal thereof for ten days. But no sale of any such
shares shall give to the purchaser thereof any right to interfere
in the conduct, management or affairs of said newspaper; or
either of them; and no such purchaser shall acquire any interest
whatever in the profits of said papers till he shall have received
a certificate or scrip for his shares, signed by all the parties here-
to, and duly registered in a book to be kept for that purpose,
which scrip shall always express from whom such shares were
purchased, and shall certify that the holder of said scrip takes
the same with notice of and subject to the articles of association
between the parties hereto, and is entitled to participate only in
that portion of the profits which may be assigned to the party so
selling to said purchaser; and shall not be entitled to any voice
or agency whatever in the conduct, control, management or
affairs of said company or of said newspapers."
In construing this article the court held that a purchaser of
shares of stock who had not complied with the articles or been
admitted to membership of the association in accordance with the
articles, did not become a member, and could not be intruded
upon the association. The sale of the shares in the attempt by
one of the members to transfer his interest to a stranger, did not
work a dissolution of the partnership or joint stock company, but
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only gave to such purchaser an equitable right to draw his por-
tion of dividends, until such company was dissolved. He would
then share with the other owners in a distribution of the com-
pany's assets. 5
It is submitted that this plan embodies all the advantages which
have been sought by the numerous devices heretofore attempted,
so many of which for various reasons, failed to accomplish the
purpose for which they were promoted.
William P. Rogers.
Dean of Cincinnati Law School.
1 This theory is sustained by Tatam v. Williams, 3 Hare's Rep., 347.
